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I. INTRODUCTION 
Microeconomics, including the study of individual choice 
and the theory of markets has generally been considered a field 
science not an experimental laboratory science. In econometric 
theory and estin1ation the concept of a controlled experiment 
generating economic data is sometimes used to explicate ideal 
techniques of hypothesis testing. But the experimental labora­
tory is considerably more important to e_conomic science than 
to serve as an ilnaginary construct en1ployed to clarify and to 
qualify the interpretation of our regression results from aggregate 
time series and from nonscientific observations on firms and 
households. There are two distinct reasons for this: 
1. The results of laboratory studies can serve as a rigorous 
empirical pre-test of economic theory prior to the use of field 
data tests. The state of economic hypothesis testing, as it is 
sometimes done, can be described roughly as follows. Based on 
casual observation of the characteristics -0f a particular market 
or industry and the f;elf-interest postulate, one writes down a model 
satisfying all the requirements of internal logical consistency. 
The model is then tested with the only body of field data that exists, 
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The results of the test turn out to be a1nbiguous, or in any case to 
call for improvements, and one is tempted to now modify the n1odel 
in ways suggested by the data "to improve the fit." This is of course 
quite unsatisfactciry since any test of significance becomes hopelessly 
confused if one now atten1pts to apply it to the same data. \\l1ere it· 
is possible and feasible, as in the study of price formation, the data 
from controlled experiments can be _used to test hypotheses stemming 
from prescientific casual observations of a particular phenomenon. 
The fact that one can always run a new experiment means that it is 
never tautological to modify the model in ·ways suggested by the results 
of the last experiment. Since economic theories always deal with 
certain alleged behavioral tendencies in isolation, the experimental 
laboratory is uniquely \vell suited for testing the validity of such 
theories. It provides an exceptionally rigorous discipline of our 
ability to model elementary situations whether or not field data can 
be regarded ultimately as having been generated by such elen1entary 
models. 
2. The results of experiments can be directly relevant to the study 
and interpretation of field data. Other so-called nonexperimental 
sciences such as meteorology and astronomy have depended crucially 
for their development on ( 1) small-scale laboratory experiments in 
the physics of mass motion, thermodynamics, and nuclear reactions; 
and (2) the postulate that such microphysical experimental results 
apply, ·with suitable modifications, to the· study of the weather, the 
planets and the stars, This parallelism, "As far as we can tell, the 
same physical laws prevail every¥'here1' (Shapley, 1964, p. 43), also 
has application to the study of social economy. Laboratory 
experience suggests that all of the characteristics of "real world" 
be�avior that we consider. to be of primitive importance -- such as 
self-interest motivation, interdeperident tastes, risk aversion, 
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subjective transactions cost (time is consumed), costly information 
{it takes time to acquire and process information), and so on -- all 
arise naturally, indeed inevitably, in experimental settings. Anyone 
who had begun the study of economics in the laboratory without these 
concepts, \vould soon find himself inventing them. Furthermore the 
process of experimental design forces one to articulate rules and 
procedures, the collection of which, forms an institution, organization, 
or "body of law" with striking "real world" parallels. It is inipossible 
to do market experiments ·without inventing fiat money, contracts, 
credit rules, and whole exchange institutions (cf. Shubik, 1974). 
The laboratory becomes a place where real people earn teal money 
for making real decisions about abstract claims that are just as 1'real" 
as commercial paper, a share of General 1\/Iotors; or a contract to 
deliver \.vheat on May 10, 
It is the premise of this paper that the study of the decision 
behavior of suitably motivated individuals and groups in laboratory 
or other socially isolated settings such as hospitals {Battalio, Kagel, 
et al., 1973) has in1portant and significant application to the develop-
ment and verification of theories of the economic system at large. 
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II. THE THEORY OF INDUCED VALUATION 
Control is the essence of experimental methodology, and 
in experin1ental exchange stu<lies it is necessary that one be able to 
state that as between two experiments individual values {e.g. demand 
or supply) either do or do noi: differ in a specified way, Such control 
can be achieved by using a reward structure to induce prescr�bed 
monetary value on abstract experimental objects or act�ons, The 
concept of induced valuation depends upon the following postulate: 
l\'onsatiation: Given a costless choice between two alternatives, 
identical except that the first yields more of the reward medium 
(usually currency) than the second, the first will always be 
chosen {preferred) over the second, by an autonomous individual, 
i.e. utility is a monotone increasing function of the monetary 
reward, U( M), U1 > O. 
Example l: In the experimental study of competitive equilibria in 
isolated markets it is nece9sary to induce known (to the experimenter) 
supply or demand on individual subjects. Let subject buyers 
i = 1, 2, . , , , n each be given a table listing increasing concave total 
receipts R
i(qi) representing the currency redemption or "resa.le" 
value of q
i 
units acquired by subject i in an experimental market. 
The instructions state that if subject i acquires qi units at prices 
i i 
P1• Pz' . . . . p
i , he will receive cash earnings of R.(q.) -q
i 1 l 
qi i L; pk. 
k=l 
Neoclassical demand is defined as the quantity that would be purchased 
as a function of a given hypothetical price p. By this definition if for 
a fixed. p a subject purchases q. units, he 
. ' 
'utility for money is U
i{Mi
) he will wish to 
earns Ri(qi) - pqi" If his 
max U.(R.(q.) - pq.]. 
qi 
l l 1 l 
We have an interior maximum if and only if 
dU 
__ i = {R� - p)U! :::: 0, U� > 0, or q. dqi 1 l l l 
5 
R
'(-l)(p), 
for the class of functions U., R, such that ' ' 
d
2U 
__ i 
2 
dqi 
(R! p)
2
U!1 + U!R!1 < 0 l 1 l l 
Given any set of n increasing concave functions, Ri(qi)' such that 
d
2
U. ' 
--2 dqi 
. 1 ( - l) < O, this reward scheme induces arbitrary demand R
i (p) 
!=>ll subject i, and the experimentally controlled market deriland becomes 
Q 
n •(-1) . :E R. (p) independent of the U . •  
i=l l l 
Similarly, let j = 1, 2, • .  , , m subject sellers be given 
q. 
J . 
cost functions C.(q.). and receive cash earnings L p� - C.(q.) from 
J J k=l . J J 
selling qj units at prices p{, p�, .. . , pj 
• 
q
j 
If utility is V.{M.), V'. > O, 
J J J 
then max V.[pq. - C.(q.)j implies 
q. J J J J 
J 
a supply function q. = 
J 
cd-'\p), 
J 
The experimentally controlled market sUpply is Q ; c'.{-lllrl 
j= l J 
independent of the V .. 
J 
The above induced supply and demand become flows per period 
in experiments in which trading is conducted in a sequence of trading 
periods (Smith, 1962, 1964), 
(, 
Exan1ple 2: Lcl subject traders be given a table listing increasing 
concave currency receipts M{x1, x2) to be paid by the exper
imenter 
for terminal stocks (x1, x2) of each of two abstract e-i:-perimental 
commodities exchanged in an experimental general equilibrium 
market, Then subject i1s unl:riown utility for currency Ui(M) induces 
the value Ui[M(x1,x2)J on terminal stocks (x1,x2). Consequently, 
the known, experin1entally controlled indifference map given by the 
level contours of M(x1,x2) are induced upon subject i independent 
of his particular Ui. That is, each subject1s marginal rate of 
substitution of x2 for x1 is given by Di M1/ UiMz = M1/M2, Di> 0. 
This allows the "Edgeworth Box" representation of gener�l exchange 
equilibrium to be reproduced experimentally by inducing a given 
indifference map on each member of one group of subjects, and 
another indifference map on each of a second group of subjects. 
With given endowments of the abstract con1modities for members of 
each of the two trading groups·, the experimental stage is set for 
exchange. A subject with initial endowment (X1, 0) will have an 
induced demand for x?. defined by M2(x1,x2)/M1{x1,x2) = p, 
xl = xl + px2. 
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III. SOME QUALIFICATIONS 
There are three important qualifications to the above theory 
which stem in part from the adjectives 11costless" and 11autonomous" 
in the nonsatiation postulate. 
1. There may be subjective costs (or values) associated with the 
n1aking or execution of market decisions. 
In a competitive market experiment a subject may find it 
arduous to monitor quotations, make his o\vn quotations, and execute 
transactions, If such considerations are not negligible, then we lose 
some control over the process of induced valuation, The effect of 
boredom and the subjective costs of decision making has been 
emphasized in the important study by Siegel (1961), Sherman (1974) 
has interpreted alleged violations of the Savage axioms in terms of 
.the subjective cost of making the appropriate computations. In terms 
of the utility interpretation of the previous section, the utility function 
can now be \vritten u\:r-A., E.) where E. is the "transactional effort'' 
' ' ' 
required to obtain re\vard Mi (cf. Liebenstein, 1969; and implicitly, 
Coase, 1960}. To see the potential in1plications of costly choice, 
consider exa1nple l of the previous section in which demand R�(-l )(p) . ' 
is induced upon i. Suppose i1s utility is now U1[R.[q.(E.}] - pq.(E.), E.} l l 1 l l l 
where it is assu1ned crudely that "bargaining effort,11 E., results in 
. l . . 
the purchase quantity qi(Ei
). Then max U
1 implies (R� - p)q�U11 + 
u'2 £. l l 
and now the induced demand is qi 
' 
R'.(-f)(p U
i
2
/Ui
l
q�) < R'.(-
1\p}, ' ' ' 
if u; < 0, qi_ > 0. Hence, if there is a cost (value) to transacting in 
the experimental task, the induced demand will be smaller (larger·). 
There are several ways of dealing with this pt•oblem: 
(a) One is to examine the experimental results to see if the quantity 
exchanged is less than predicted. If it is, this is consistent with a 
o, 
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significant transactions cost. Awareness of such transactions cost 
effects provides a valuable clue to understanding why certain experiment!' 
may fail to produce predicted results. The process is not tautological 
as long as one can i·edesign the experiment and show that such conjectured 
transactional effects can be reduced. 
{b) Another approach is to Use a reward structure to compensate 
for, or offset, the subjective costs of transacting. There are two 
ways of doing this. (i) One way (Siegel, 1961) is to simply raise the 
reward level. This increases the subjective value relative to the sub­
jective cost of acquiring units q.. Let et be a scale parameter determining ' . 
reward level. Then utility becomes U1(et(R.[q.(E.Jl - pq.(E.)), E.}. 
1 l l l l ' l 
1{-l) i i 1(-l) Induced demand is now "CJ., = R. (p - u 2/U1q'.c.-) --? R. (p) in the l 1 1 l 
limit as a increases provided that the marginal rate of substitution -C�/lJ�q� 
decreases, or increases less than proportionally, with the reward 
level. If, for example, U
i
(11., E.) is additive, then 
d
d [-l1i /U11
. 
q�] < 0 . . l l 0. 2 l 
and lim [-U12/u
'
1q� a.]--?- O. (ii) Alternatively, and this is the a- ' 
device used most extensively; subjects are promised a slight 
comn1ission, S (I use 5 cents), for each transaction in addition to 
their cash trading profits. 
and induced demand is 
Now utility is U
i[R.[q.(E.}j - (p - S)q.(E.), E.}, 1 1 1  1 1  l 
= R'(-1)( - s - ui /Ui ') ';::!. R'(-1)( ) 'f r3 � - ui /Ui 1 0 q
i i 
p 2 1 qi i 
p l 2 1 qi > . 
Err,I->irically, a 5 cent commission appears sufficient to induce subjects 
to trade their marginal units in most instances. 
Compare two experiments (Plott and Smith, 1975, pp. 
in which the induced supply and demand condition were identical but 
th: first Paid no cash trading commission, only trading profit, while 
the second paid both: In the first experiment volume was below (l 7-18 
units) the '1theoretical" equilibrium quantity ( 20 units) in all seven 
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trading periods; in the second experiment volume was below (19 units) 
equilibriun1 in only two of eight trading periods. 
2. Individuals may attach game value to experimental outcomes. 
A profit in '1points, 11 R1(qi) - pqi' may have subjective value 
VJRi(qi) - pq1J. If v1 is monotone increasing then such game utilities 
create no methodological probleins since they reinforce rather than 
distort the effect of an explicit monetary reward structure. Because 
of such game utilities it is often possible in sin1ple-task experiments 
to get satisfactory results without monetary rewards by using instructions 
to induce value by role-playing behavior (i. e, 11think of yoursel_f as 
making a profit of such and such when . , , n) , But such game values 
are likely to be weak, erratic, and easily dOminated by transactions 
costs, and subjects may be readily satiated with npoint" profits. 
Qualifications l and 2 are illustrated in the convergence 
behavior of some experimental markets with no cash rewards 
(Charts 1, 2, and 3/and son1e markets with con1plete and with random 
cash rewards (Chart 4).2 In Charts 1-3 �ubjects were asked to imagine 
that trading profits and con1missions \vere real. In each case (including 
4) the market v.-·as organized as a continuous double auction. (Buyers 
could make oral bids and sellers oral offers for a single unit, and any 
seller could accept a bid, any buyer an offer. Each subject knew only 
his own demand or supply conditions.){See Smith, 1964, pp. 199-201 
for the instructions. ) In Chart 1 each subject had a capacity to trade 
only one unit per trading period, The absence of cash rewards does 
not hinder convergence to prices near equilibrium by the third trading 
period. Ho\vever, deviations increase in period 4. In the absence of 
cash rewards this is more likely to occur as gaming boredom follows 
an initial (pleasant) experience of learning, 
Chart 2 is an experiment in which buyers received multiunit 
revenue (or resale value) schedules, and sell�rs multiunit total cost 
schedules. There were three buyers with one schedule, eight with 
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another; four sellers with one cost schedule, eight with another. 
The s.upply and demand graphs shown are the horizontal sums of 
the implied marginal revenue and cost schedules, Now the task of 
profit maxin1ization is more difficult than in Chart 1, and incentives 
are weak, Price convergence is strong especially in the second period 
since the greater volume when traders are given multiple-unit capacities 
increases the learning experience within a trading period. But observe 
that volume is considerably below {24 and 26 units in the first and 
second periods) the competitive prediction {30 units). This is consistent 
with the above theory where the task is more difficult (hi&her trans'ictions 
cost) and monetary rewards are absent, 
Chart 3 illustrates an experiment which fails to reach either 
the competitive price or quantity although the market stabilizes nicely. 
In this case equilibrium requires contract prices to fall to the common 
limit price of all sellers. They are to "imagine'' themselves 
as making a 5 cent commission on trades at these lin1it prices, 
but clearly this is not real enough to induce many contracts at $3.10, 
Not even a decrease in dem�nd succeeded in lowering contracts to $3.10. 
This contrasts with Chart 4a and 4b consisting of two experiments with 
complete cash rewards in which the supply and demand are even more 
asymmetric than in Chart 3. Convergence to the competitive price 
and quantity is evident by trading period 4, although, at the equilibrium 
price, each buyer receives $1.15 profit including commission per trade 
while each seller receives only the 5 cent commission, This design is 
a particularly rigorous test of the equilibrating power of the double 
auction (sze Smith, 1965). 
A controlled measurement of the effect of complete versus 
randon-1 monetary rewa.rds is shown in Chart 4(a), (b) and (d). Three 
different subject groups participated in three double auction markets 
consisting of eleven buyers each with limit prices $4.20 and sixteen 
13 
IV. T\VO EXPERIMENTAL 11.ARKETS V\'ITH GROWING DEMAND 
Hess ( 1972 ) has studied the efiects of period-by-period 
changes in both supply and den1and in an experiinental double auction 
market. However, the subjects did not receive cash profit rewards and 
as we have seen above, this can effect outcomes in market experiments. 
The sequence of changed supply and demand was designed to create 
and reinforce the expectation that price rises a fixed amount (10 cents) 
each period. The e.ffe.ct of this expectation on the subsequent theoretical 
equilibria was determined in each of four diff�rent experimental sessions, 
This price expectation "treatn1ent" was found to bias '.lctual prices away 
from their theoretical values, 
Arrow (1960) and Arrow and Capron (1959) have discussed 
price-quantity adjustments in competitive markets with rising den1ands. 
. Assun1ing a linear rise in demand functions and a linear \Valrasian 
adjustment process, Arrow proves several propositions briefly para-
phrased as follows: 
l ,  The shortage (defined as excess de1nand) increases from the initial 
value of 0 toward an asymptotic limit. 
2. Prices rise, and the increase approaches a constant rate (usually 
positi\·e) depending only on supply and demarid conditions. 
3, Actual price is always below the price that would clear the market. 
These propositions also hold under the hypothesis of adaptive expectations, 
i.e. where the economic agent compares actual price with his previous 
expectation of it and then forms a new expectation by revising his 
previous expectation in the direction of the actual price (Arrow, 1.960, 
PP• 11-13). 
This section reports two experiments designed to 
approximate the conditions of the above propositions and to test their 
validity. In each experiment demand rises line�rly over time, where 
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11timc" is 111easured in terms of trading periods, and the experimental 
supply and den1and conditions are approximately linear. 
Subjects and Procedures 
Twenty-seven subjects participated in the first experiment 
and forty-seven in the second. The instructions were those of the 
double auction (Smith, 1964, pp. 199-201) where both buyers and. 
sellers are permitted to make oral quotations {bids or offers). Each 
buyer (seller) received a 5 cent commission in addition to the profit 
from exchange, 
Experiment 1 consisted of six trading periods. Al· the end of 
each of the first four trading periods the buyers' cards were collected, 
and a new set of buyer limit prices, corresponding to an increase in 
demand, were distributed randomly among the buyers. Consequently, 
the highest limit buyer in period l would not be, except by accident, the 
highest limit buyer in period 2. The first five trading periods were 
characterized by the five demand arrays exhibited on the left of Chart 6. 
At the end of the fifth trading period the buyer limit cards were collected, 
just as in the previous periods, except that this time the new cards that 
were distributed corresponded to a repeat treatment of the period 5 
demand condition, Hence, 'the subjects did not know at any time that 
the demand had increased in periods 2 through 5, nor that it had not 
increased in the case of period 6. They knew only what was obvious 
that buyers "'ere receiving new limit price cards. Subject information 
consisted only of their private limit prices, and the sequence of verbal 
bids, offers, and contract prices that prevailed in each trading period. 
Experiment 2 used approximately the same supply and den1and 
conditions as in 1, except that seven tra�ing periods were c�nducted 
wi_th the six derr.and schedules shown on the left of Chart 7. In experi­
ment l the subjects were Stanford University undergraduates; in 
experiment 2 the subjects were Purdue University undergraduates. 
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sellers each with limit prices $3.10. In 4(a) and 4(b) the subjects were 
all paid their trading profit plus commission in cash, while in 4(d) at 
the end of each trading period, four of the 27 subjects were chosen 
at random to receive cash profits. The chart demonstrates that the 
"<veaker random reward structure retards the market1s equilibrium 
tendency. In period 4 of Chart 4(d) only one contract is at the equilibrium 
price, $3.10; this compares with five equilibrium contracts in 4(a) and 
eleven in 4(b). 
Qualifications l and 2 lead to a precautionary corollary: 
\Yi th or without monetary rewards, the experimenter. may be tempted 
t6 add 11realism1' by giving the abstract experimental commodity a 
name such as "wheat," or otherwise attempt to use instructions to 
simulate the alleged circumstances of a particular market. This runs 
the danger of so enriching induced values that control over valuation is 
lost, Suppose, as above, that a subject is paid R1(qi
) - pq1, but also 
perceives that he must attach instruction-induced value to qi, Utility 
may 110\V be Ui[R.{q.) - pq.,q.], and demand becomes q. = R�(-ll(p - u12
. 
/u11J > 1 1  1 1  . 1 l 
R�{-l )(p). Consequently, it n1ay be preferable not to embellish the ' �-
instructions with well-intentioned ·attempts at realism. Let the explicit 
reward structure be the singular source of valuation, insofar as this 
is possible. 
3, Individuals may not be autonomous own-reward maximizers. 
Interpersonal utility criteria may qualify the theory of induced 
valuation. Thus subject i1s utility 1nay depend upon both i's and k's 
re\vard, U
i
[R.(q.) - pq., R1 (qk) - pqkJ. If this condition prevails, then l 1 l <: 
the demand of i may depend upon that of k. However, this kind. of 
interdependence is effectively controlled by the e.xperimental condition 
of "incomplete11 information, first defined and studied by Fouraker and 
Siegel (1960, 1963) in experimental studies of bilateral bargaining and 
oligopoly. Under incomplete information subji:cts only know their 
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own payoff contingencie.s, \Vith R
k(qk
) - pqk 
unknown to i, it cannot 
appear as a subjective argument of ui. 
The effect when sltbjccts have complete information (Fouraker 
and Siegel, 1963) on each other1s payoff contingencies is seen in 
Charts 4 and 5 by comparing 4i! (5a) and 4b(5b) with 4c(Sc): In 4a and 
4b each subject knew only his own limit price. In 4c{5c) the only 
change in the instructions was to add the information that there·were 
eleven buyers, each with a $4.20 resale value, and sixteen (nineteen 
in Sc) sellers, each with unit cost $3.10. From the transaction price 
series it is seen that "complete" information of this kind retards 
the equilibrium tendencies of the double auction. Contract prices 
in trading periods 2 through 4 tend to be higher under complete 
information than under incomplete information. The explanation is that 
with information on each other's payoffs, the way is open for 11equity" 
considerations to modify self-interest choices. Sellers, believing that 
it is "fair11 for trading profits to be shared between buyers and sellers, 
try to resist price decreases more vigorously than \1.·hen they do not 
know what constitutes such a fair price. Buyers acquiesce in this 
sharing by accepting many contracts well above $3.10, but since there 
is an excess of sellers, those holding out for the higher prices are 
the sellers most likely to fail to make contracts, Consequently, contract 
prices tend to decline, if slowly, when excess supply is 5, but rnore 
rapidly when excess supply is 8. The tendency of prices to be higher 
under complete information is contrary to the view of Knight (1933, p. 197) 
and other economists who have argued that 11perfect" information was 
essential for establishing competitive prices. The results are consistent 
with the game-theoretic proposition that more information increases 
the pra.spect of collusion {Shubik, 1959, p. 171 ), and with.the results of 
Fouraker and Siegel (1963, p. 187) in which the tendency of the 
competitive equilibrium to prevail under duopoly bargaining is reduced 
under complete information. 
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Experin1cntal Hcsults and Discussion 
The response of contract prices in expcrin1ents l ancl 2 is 
graphed on the right in Charts 6 and 7. Contract prices tend to be 
equal to or below the theoretical equilibrium in the fir<:t three periods 
of each experiment. In experiment 1 (2), only one (three) of the fifteen 
contracts in periods l to 3 were above equil�briun1. But in period 5 
of experin1ent 1 only one contract is below the theoretical equilibrium, 
and in experiment 2, period 6, only three of thirteen contracts are 
below equilibrium, Proposition 3 clearly fails in period 5 of experi­
ment one and period 6 of experiment 2. Uslng a t test on the means 
of contract prices in these t\vo periods, we are decidedly unable to 
reject the null hypothesis {proposition 3 is taken as the res·earch hypothesis) 
that the data came from populations with means in excess of $3. 00 in 
experiment l and $3.125 in experiment 2. In each exPeriment the 
experience of rising p:;_·ices eventually produced expectations that caused 
sellers to raise their offers {and buyers to accept) above the theoretical 
equilibrium. 
Evidence contrary to proposition 1 is shown in Table 1. The 
"shortage".is interpreted as excess demand prevailing at the mean 
contract price. The proposition is violated in period 5 of experiment 
and periods 4, 5, and 6 of experiment 2. 
These tests add further weight to the evidence that macromarket 
adjustment mechanism:; such as the Walrasian (Sn1ith, 1965) and the 
cob\veb'hypotheses (Carlson, 1967) are unsatisfactory. 
Period 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
16 
TABLE 1 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Mean Price Shortage Mean Price Shortage 
2.20 0 2.10 2 
2.36 l 2.34 2 
2.53 2 2.40 4 
2.73 z 2.725 0 
3.05 -1 2.904 0 
3.219 -3 
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INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
T roding Period 
2 I 3 4 
3·00 
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 
4.00 
3.75 
3.50 
3.25 
Transaction Number 
(d) RANDOM REWARD, 
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
Trading Period 
2 I 3 4 
3���1 , ,I ,' �-;��r-,--J-�-�r�--,r-�-�i----
5 10 15 20 
. 
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 3.00 5 10 5 JO · 5 10 5 10 
. Transaction Number Quantity Transaction Number 
Price 
4.201----, 
4.00 D 
3.75 
3.50 
3.25 
4.00 
s 
3.75 
e=S 3.50 
3.25 
CHART 5 
(a) COMPLETE REWARD, 
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
Trading Period 
2 I 3 4 
4.00 
3.75 
. 3.50 
3.25 
(b) COMPLETE REWARD,
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
Trading Period 
2 I 3 4 
310 1 I ·---- 1----1----3 .0 0 I I I I 3 00 '---'------'-'--'------'.1--'------''--'----l.l 5 10 15 20 . 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
Quantity Transaction Number 
Price 
4.20t----, 
4.00f-
3.75'-'-
350� 
3.25 
3.10 
·3.ool I 5 
D 4.00 
s 
3.75 
1 .. , r350 
3.25 
JI I I 3 00 10 15 20 .
Quantity 
(c) COMPLETE REWARD,
COMPLETE INFORMATION 
5 
Trading Period 
2 I 3 4 
10 5 10 5 10 5 JO
Transaction Number 
3.00 5 JO 5 10 5 10 - ·-
Transaction Number 
Price 
3.75 
3.50 
0 5 .JO 
Quantity 
03 
D2 
I J I J2 I I o, .J 
J 5 2 2 4 
CHART 6 
3 I J I J 
2 4 6 8 
I 
; roding reriod 
5 
I I I I I I I I I 
2 4 6 8 2 4 6 8 JO 
Transaction Number 
6 
I 
2 4 6 8 JO 
Price 
3.75 
3.50 
3.25 
3.00 
1.75 
0 5 10 
Quantity 
2 
2 2 4 
I 
15 
3 
CHART 7 
4 
Trading Period 
5 6 7 
2 4 6 2 4 6 8 10 2 4 6 8 10 2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12 
Transaction Number 
FOOTNOTES 
l. Charts I and 3 are reproduced from Sn1ith (1962). Chart 2 reports 
a previously unpublished experiment. 
2. In Chart 4, (a) and (b} are from experiments rcporte� in Smith 
(1965); (c) and (d) are the results of previously unpublished 
experiments. 
3. In Chart 5, (a) and (b) are from experiments reported in Smith 
{1965); {c) is based on a previously unpublished experiment. 
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